Why Marketing Doesn’t Deliver

October 26, 2016

Every organisation in the world spends a fortune on marketing, to the extent the DeliveryDemon would have to go entirely off the grid to avoid the deluge. With that volume, it’s not surprising that it’s easy to find examples of stupidity. One of the commonest marketing fails is when an organisation is so busy preening its corporate ego that it completely loses site of the real customer experience. Microsoft’s latest idiocy provides a classic example.

For most people, email is a utility – boring stuff but it needs to be there and usable, low key but reliable. It doesn’t have to look pretty or to keep coming up with new bells and whistles when a typical user ignores most of the facilities already in existence. Hotmail used to be a good utilitarian email. It popped up quickly on the screen. It was easy to skim through emails and get rid of the trash. Emails could be sorted. There were reasonable filters. It was pretty good at identifying spam. And, having been around for so long, a hotmail address was reasonably memorable.

For a good while after taking it over, Microsoft let Hotmail be. Then came the change to Outlook. Now Outlook on a business network has been a pretty reasonable utility too, but that wasn’t carried forward when Hotmail became Outlook. Loading became painfully slow. Months later it hasn’t improved. On an iPad it’s still totally unreliable, verging on unusable. First it displays a smug little picture showing how the floppy disc supersedes snail mail. Below that appears what the DeliveryDemon at first assumed to be a progress bar. Actually it’s a throwback to the 1980s, when time and again users would watch the blue bar inch painfully slowly across the screen, only to freeze when it reached a fraction from the end. Time and again it does this, with refresh and URL reentry making not the slightest bit of difference. The DeliveryDemon has left the progress bar for 40 minutes and it still didn’t display any emails, hit refresh over 100 times without anything useful happening. Sometimes there is a complete access fail because the site has failed entirely. And of course there are no updates from Microsoft to let users know what is happening.

That’s the user experience. How does Microsoft marketing handle it? With a classic demonstration of being blinded by focus on the big fat corporate ego, that’s how.

Several times during this (ongoing) fiasco, the DeliveryDemon has had emails from Microsoft marketeers. ‘Now that you’ve been using Outlook.com and some of its features for a while, we hope you’ll try one free month of Office 365 to see how much more you can do.’ Lets translate that into user experience.

Now that you’ve been using Outlook.com and some of its features for a while…. –
Now you have endured for a while the primitively slow response times and clunky user interface……

….we hope you’ll try one free month of Office 365…. – A free month is nothing but a cynical attempt to entice users into locking themselves into something which is barely usable and certainly not worth paying for when that month runs out….

….to see how much more you can do – If it can’t even do the basics at a barely competent level, it sure as hell isn’t going to do anything more useful.

In other words, Microsoft has made crap out of something useful and its marketing department are so enamoured of their own verbiage that they expect the world to be equally blind and shell out hard cash in response to that slimy marketing-speak.

Of course there may be another agenda behind this. Maybe the end of free Hotmail is in sight. Maybe Microsoft hopes that enough users will transfer to the paid for product so that any furore following the withdrawal of Hotmail will be minimal. If that’s the case, the marketing needs to be a damn sight more intelligent than the current efforts. And if that does happen, the DeliveryDemon will follow the oft-tested prudent advice. If something which works well is withdrawn, don’t blindly accept the offered replacement. Treat that replacement as just another product and evaluate it against whatever else is available. And of course, that replacement offering starts with an immediate handicap – it comes from a supplier which values its corporate ego over the customer’s need for continuity and reliability.


Delivering An Open Letter to BT

June 23, 2016

An open letter because BT continues with its custom of blatant dishonesty and obstruction of customer complaints. This letter was sent to Gavin Paterson, BT’s CEO, following a correspondence string which invariably received responses whose honesty was noticeable by its absence.

It appears that your staff are unable to check customer history correctly. Your complaints system should have comprehensive details of my previous complaints which state very clearly that, having been an extremely dissatisfied customer of BT, I was formally requiring that you did not pester me with junk sales communication via any channel.

It is unsatisfactory that your staff are pretending that the problem lies with another company. This is WRONG. I had enough unpleasant dealings with BT to be very sure of the name of the company causing the problem.

Your staff claim that the problem would not have existed were the number registered with TPS. Your staff should be capable of checking this before making such a stupid recommendation. They should also have the basic understanding that TPS registration is done directly, not through the service supplier. The number has in fact been registered with TPS for years, apart from a brief period when BT abused its position by instructing TPS to remove the number from its Do Not Call list. If your staff think that the TPS list is an effective way of preventing unwanted calls, then your processes should ensure that a check is made against TPS records BEFORE attempting to nuisance call people.

It is also clear from the reply below that your processes are unacceptably inadequate in dealing with the issue of nuisance calls. When BT is told that its nuisance calls are unwanted it has no excuse for failing to record that, whether or not the requirement comes from a BT customer. In this instance, your staff are wrong in claiming that there is no account to mark. There is the historic account, whose management left me disgusted with BT’s dishonesty. And, as I said in earlier correspondence, you are holding sufficient information to have my name associated with the number. Were you making the least attempt to comply with the Data Protection Act, this alone should have prevented your nuisance call.

It is very clear that BT is hiding behind company size and ignorant staff to try and block serious complaints. While this is not surprising given BT’s history, it is completely unacceptable.


Aiding and Abetting Criminal Activity

December 9, 2014

That’s what our phone companies are doing. It is an offence to harass people. It is fraud to entice people into believing that they have money due to them when the caller has no evidence that that is the case. It is an offence to hold people’s data without their permission. It is fraud to lie to persuade people to reveal their personal information. According to a government task force, a BILLION of these crimes are committed every year, with the assistance of our phone companies.
Our telecoms companies are making money out of these crooks, one way or another. They are certainly making no effort to prevent their infrastructure being used for criminal activity, despite being fully aware of the scale of what is going on. All we get is mealy mouthed platitudes recommending that we take actions which are either unfeasible or ineffective. Let’s get a few facts straight on just how useless these recommendations are.

  • Register with TPS? It’s a waste of time.
    • TPS doesn’t actually do anything with complaints
    • The crooks ignore TPS anyway
  • Block callers?
    • The crooks are spoofing numbers so blocking one number has little effect
  • Don’t answer if the number is withheld?
    • There are, unfortunately, some genuine companies which call from withheld numbers, ignoring good customer service for their own administrative convenience
  • Don’t answer if you don’t recognise the number?
    • Few if any people have complete knowledge of all the numbers they could be called from, whether personal or business. A child whose phone battery is dead could borrow a friend’s phone to call so no parent can afford to ignore unknown numbers. A friend can change phone number. A business contact could call from a landline when you only have their mobile number recorded. There is a host of reasons why a call from an unknown number could be both valid and important.

There are various reporting mechanisms – the ICO, Action Fraud, TPS, Ofcom, to name but a few. All those websites are badly designed. Their automated responses are uninformative and, in the case of Action Fraud, hide the content of their response in a dubious looking attachment. There is little if any evidence of any use being made of the information provided by these routes.
It would not be unreasonable to expect phone companies to make significant and meaningful effort to prevent their infrastructure being used to harass people, commit large scale fraud, and commit widespread identity theft. It would not be unreasonable to expect legitimate organisations not to behave in a way which emulates crooked behaviour.
Here are a few suggestions for the Nuisance Call Task Force.

  • Make it an offence to spoof a number
  • Make it an offence to deliver a call with a spoofed number
  • Make it an offence for a commercial organisation to withhold their number
  • Make it an offence for any organisation to sell or give away the personal details they collect
  • Limit the period for which an organisation can retain personal details and use them for sales and marketing
  • Create a single, simple, effective means of reporting the numbers used by scammers
  • Use the scammer reporting facility to create and maintain a single database of numbers recognised as being used by scammers
  • Make the database publicly visible
  • Flag numbers which are consistently being used in a criminal manner – say after 10 reports of the number as one which makes scam / harassing calls
  • Make it an offence for a phone company to issue the scamming number to anyone
  • Make the ban on reissue of scammer numbers meaningful – say a 10 year ban on their reissue
  • Make use of existing legislation to prosecute scammers for harassment as well as data protection and telecoms offences
  • Hold the directors of those companies responsible – directors of the calling company, its parent company, and any company on whose behalf it makes outbound calls
  • Since the crimes are being committed in this country in the homes of those being called, ignore the country of residence of those responsible for the scams and arrest any responsible directors who set foot in this country
  • Recognise that it is individuals who are responsible for encouraging / permitting these crimes and hold all directors responsible and liable to prosecution
  • Set penalties so that they automatically include both default and a significant fine

So why does the DeliveryDemon thinks this would work?

  • It will create an incentive for phone companies to take responsibility for the way in which they allow their infrastructure to be used
  • It would prevent genuine customers from being issued with numbers which people have blocked because the numbers were being used for scam calls
  • It would prevent banks from grooming their customers to give away security information to people who call them – for over a decade banks’ cavalier attitude to customer security has been demonstrated time and again when they make outbound calls to customers and proceed to ask for passwords and other sensitive information
  • It would encourage organisations to start to take data protection seriously
  • It would do away with the loophole which allows all the enforcement organisations to abdicate responsibility for scam calls originating overseas
  • A mandatory penalty of imprisonment would prevent those responsible from buying their way out of loss of liberty
    Significant fines for every offence would start to undermine the business model which makes scam calls profitable.

Let’s face it, we are talking of 32 crimes every second of every day. If our politicians and legislature and police and regulators aren’t prepared to take this seriously, the DeliveryDemon wonders what the hell we pay them for.


Banks that don’t deliver

August 7, 2012

The DeliveryDemon prefers to avoid dealing with financial institutions, primarily because of the enormous effort required to overcome their incompetence. The validity of this prejudice was confirmed recently during an attempt to open a very simple bank account https://deliverydemon.wordpress.com/2012/06/20/delivering-complexity-at-the-expense-of-security/

But the saga didn’t end there. Despite the DeliveryDemon having previously entered her details online – and she knows how to spell her own name – when she went to a branch to complete the tedious and primitive process, the bank person (teller? salesman?) managed to introduce an incorrect spelling. When the DeliveryDemon pointed this out, and expressed the wish to have cards and cheque book showing the name she normally uses, the bank person claimed to have corrected it. This was followed by the staggering assertion that, having introduced the error, the bank would send me documentation in the incorrect name as well as correct documentation.

So what actually happened?

  • A chequebook arrived with the incorrect name
  • A paying in book arrived with the incorrect name
  • TWO cards arrived in the SAME envelope, one with the incorrect name and one with the correct name, with the covering letter referring to BOTH cards
  • Two separate envelopes arrived in the same post as the cards, with PINs for each card – not particularly good security.

Today the DeliveryDemon spent nearly half an hour on the phone to their hell centre to try and sort the mess out.  The first clueless idiot, who couldn’t even read what was on the screen in front of her, just bleated that she wasn’t capable of changing details. Rather than waste time, the DeliveryDemon asked to talk to the supervisor. This person waffled on about stuff having gone missing – in fact he was referring to the cards etc that I had received with the incorrect name on them. Eventually he stopped waffling for long enough to arrange for corrected chequebook and paying in book to be sent, but the card problem was handled elsewhere.

When the DeliveryDemon got through to the bunch who deal with cards, their first suggestion was that they would send new cards to the branch to be picked up – a round journey of 80 miles, not to mention the time wasted and the tedious hanging around in the branch –  suggesting incorrectly and without checking the facts that cards had been sent which the DeliveryDemon had not received.

Eventually it transpired that nothing had gone missing but the bank had generated an incorrect card and a correct card and had chosen to send out BOTH cards in the same envelope. There is clearly a complete lack of intelligence in the system to pick up the fact that two cards were being sent for a single signatory account. Even if it had been a multiple signatory account, sending two cards in the same envelope is poor security, and the fact that this can happen indicates that, if the card sticking and envelope stuffing gets out of sequence, there’s nothing in the process to stop cards going to the wrong person.

This is the same bank which wants the customer to come up with EIGHT so-called authentication factors, considering it a form of security to ask a customer for information which is in the public domain. It hasn’t registered the fact that anything which makes a number memorable also makes it easier to guess. And it’s far too stupid to realise that, even if someone is sufficiently media-led to have a favourite sleb, that is hardly the sort of stable information that makes for a decent authentication factor – just how many people are going to contact their bank every few weeks to announce that they have gone off Lady Gaga recently and much prefer Metallica?

Clearly this bank has no concept of the basics of security. Like so many institutions it has confused security with making it difficult for customers to access their own money. And to confirm that staggering absence of commitment to customer service, it expects customers to go out of their way to sort out mistakes whcih arise purely from the bank’s incompetence.


Delivering Complexity at the Expense of Security

June 20, 2012

The DeliveryDemon is frequently flabbergasted by the sheer stupidity demonstrated by so many financial institutions when it comes to security. They obstinately pretend that imposing complexity on account access equates to security, in the face of all evidence to the contrary. At the same time they refuse to acknowledge that their own processes are often staggeringly insecure.

Some time ago after a trip abroad, the DeliveryDemon had a phone message claiming her credit card had been compromised, and asking her to ring the issuer on an unidentifiable number. It clearly sounded like a scam which needed to be reported to the issuer. So the DeliveryDemon phoned the switchboard and asked to be put through to the person who had left the message. She was unsurprised when the switchboard had never heard of this person, and asked to be put through to the security and fraud department – where she found herself talking to the person who had left the suspect message.

So how many security mistakes was that?

  • Leaving a message about a card compromise on a landline answering machine without knowing who might pick it up
  • Asking the cardholder to ring a number which could belong to any scammer
  • Creating a situation designed to justify a request for secure information, using a process riddled with fundamental security flaws
  • Preventing a customer from carrying out basic security checks by using a name not recognised by the switchboard.

But the biggest mistake of all was the fact that some time afterwards the DeliveryDemon had to deal with the identical flawed process. Needless to say, the DeliveryDemon had complained to the card issuer on the first occasion, yet the organisatioj had taken no notice of the complaint and had continued knowingly to operate processes which were fundamentally insecure.

This type of stupidity is remarkably common in the financial services sector, and a couple of very similar examples are described in an earlier post .

https://deliverydemon.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/delivering-poor-banking-security/

The other side of this refusal to operate secure processes is a determined effort to create barriers to prevent a customer from accessing their own funds. This goes hand in hand with lengthy and inequitable Ts and Cs which attempt to absolve banks from any responsibility whatsoever. The DeliveryDemon recently encountered this while opening a very basic bank account. This ‘simple’ account required no less than EIGHT authentication factors, including providing answers to some remarkably stupid questions.

  • A memorable number? Seriously? Numbers are not intrinsically memorable. Those which are memorable usually relate to public domain information, which is hardly secure.
  • Details of various third parties? Public domain again. It is also questionable in data protection terms whether a bank should be asking for information about third parties who have nothing to do with the account.
  • Favourite TV programs, newspapers, historical person, sleb, town? Get a life! This sort of preference is transient and likely to be forgotten months or years down the line when it is eventually needed in order to deal with some call centre drone who is not empowered to think beyond the mindless detail on the screen in front of them.

This sort of pseudo security is not just stupid in its own right, it is creating a situation where complexity makes life difficult for the customer, while being used as an excuse for financial institutions to try to avoid their own responsibilities.

Put these so-called security processes in the context of today’s digital native. Basic security advice is not to use the same details in multiple places, since compromise of one account can lead to compromise elsewhere. Typically, an account asks for 4 pieces of information, even when no financial transactions are involved. Try counting them up. Even without an intricate lifestyle the following range of accounts is pretty commonplace.

  • Mortgage
  • Mortgage-related insurance
  • Life insurance
  • Health insurance
  • Current account
  • Savings account
  • Debit card
  • Credit card
  • ISA
  • Pension
  • E-mail account
  • Work e-mail account
  • Mobile account
  • Landline / broadband account
  • Car insurance
  • Car radio code
  • Electricity account
  • Gas account
  • Water account
  • Council tax account
  • Supermarket account
  • Amazon account
  • i-Tunes account
  • Comparison site accounts – up to half a dozen
  • Social media accounts – another half a dozen
  • Technology support arrangements – say 3
  • Travel accounts for commuters – another couple
  • Online information sources such as newspapers, news sites and the like – say 3.

All of these want a login ID and a password, plus several additional pieces of information for ‘security’ should you be unable to log in. Security guidance suggest that unique information should be used for each situation, and that the information should not be written down in a recognisable format, even when months or years may elapse between accesses to the account.

Put this into the context of the real world. Current security guidance expects the individual to memorise in excess of 172 unique pieces of information, and to relate each piece of information to one of 43 or more situations. Current practice is for Ts and Cs to forbid keeping written records of passwords in any useful format. This is complete nonsense, not security.

So what’s the answer? There are organisations which can be used to store multiple passwords, but these then become a single point of failure should the access password be compromised or the organisation’s own security be breached. It’s not clear whether this sort of password storage is acceptable under access Ts and Cs either.  Even if banks start to give some form of approval to these organisations, it could be withdrawn, leaving the customer with the option of dealing with multiple password holders or changing to a new one. If a security breach underlies the reason for change, that would mean working through every single account to change access details. In some circumstances that may mean the delay of going through the account provider to replace codes which they do not allow the customer to change.

The current security situation is clearly unsatisfactory, ineffective,  and unfair to the customer. The DeliveryDemon thinks it is time that organisations which are responsible for security got together with both security and usability experts to come up with a solution which is designed to protect the customer’s interests, not a solution based on allowing financial institutions to avoid responsibility.


Delivering Poor Banking Security

April 2, 2012

The DeliveryDemon has the rather naive expectation that banks who are entrusted with our money should operate reasonably secure procedures. Hang your heads in shame RBS and Barclays.

The DeliveryDemon has had cause to complain to both banks recently. In each case the complaint was about their processes, not anything specific to the account. In both cases an idiot from their customer ‘service’ team phoned up and demanded to know secure account access details before they would consider listening to the complaint. Do they really think it is sensible for someone to give out account password information to a random caller?

RBS, there is no need to access my account in order to hear that it does not constitute ‘faster payment’ if you take details of a payment on Friday and can’t process it till Tuesday unless the I ring again on Monday.

In fact there is no need for your customer ‘service’ to access my account at all. The default action should NEVER be to access the customer account. Basic security is that this should only be done if the customer raises a matter specific to the account, i.e. if there is a genuine need to access the account.

Banks are piling on nuisance value processes to make it more difficult for the customer to access their own money, all in the name of security. It’s about time they got their own house in order, introduced secure internal processes and gave their customer contact staff some basic security training.


Not Delivering Faster Payments

March 30, 2012

Since the bureaucrats took over RBS, the service has been going rapidly downhill, to the point that now they cannot even operate the faster payments system which banks should have been signed up to for several years.

The online service was never good, a classic example of security completely overwhelming usability. With public ownership, the phone service was drastically reduced. Then the ability to set up advance payments was cut back. The commonest requirement for advance payments is the ten month council tax cycle. It was once possible to set up 6 months worth of payments at a time, but that has been cut back to 3. Instead of 1 oppportunity to forget a payment, RBS has created 3.

The latest service cutback is the faster payments system, to which all banks are nominally committed. This system should, within certain limits, transfer money to the payee’s account within 2 hours. Not with RBS. The latest unintelligent development to their system cannot cope with a payment being set up on a Friday evening. It won’t do anything with it till the Tuesday. If the customer wants a payment to arrive on the Monday, they have to phone again on the Monday. In other words, RBS’s system cannot cope effectively with faster payments for nearly 3 days out of 7. The DeliveryDemon is seriously unimpressed with this constant erosion of customer service.

The gulf between the words ‘public’ and ‘service’ has never been wider. And it’s growing.